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We present a simple protocol for certifying graph states in quantum networks using stabiliser
measurements. The certification statements can easily be applied to different protocols using graph
states. We see for example how it can be used to for measurement based verified quantum compu-
tation, certified sampling of random unitaries and quantum metrology and sharing quantum secrets
over untrusted channels.
INTRODUCTION
Graph states are a family of multipartite quantum
states, defined in one to one correspondance with a sim-
ple graph [1]. They are incredibly useful resources across
quantum information, acting as the key entanglement re-
source for error correction [2], measurement based quan-
tum computation [3], quantum secret sharing [4] and
more [1]. Furthermore, they can be implemented in many
different ways, for example in optics [5–7], [8, 9] includ-
ing on chip [10], in ion traps [11, 12], super conducting
qubits [13] and NV centres [14].
Many methods exist for testing graph states varying
in the trust that must be assumed and the kind of state-
ments that are made. With respect to trust assumptions,
on the one hand techniques such as tomography [15] and
entanglement witnesses [16] make assumptions about the
source and measurements (essentially that they are hon-
est but noisy). On the other hand tests which require
the least trust, where neither the source nor the mea-
surement devices are trusted, such as self testing [17],
are incredibly demanding to implement in a way that
closes all loopholes (necessary for security).
In this work we explore the mid ground, where (local)
measurement devices are trusted, but sources and chan-
nels are not [7, 18–20]. Our statements of confidence are
tailored to this end, following the language of quantum
authentication [21], particularly suited to applications for
quantum networks. At the end of the protocol one gets a
quantum output - the state we want to use - and a clas-
sical output - which tells us weather we accept or reject.
A successful test for us is then one that always accepts
an ideal source, and outputs the ideal source state (com-
pleteness), and if it accepts, the state is not too far from
the ideal state (soundness - see below for technical defini-
tions). With this in hand, we see how it can be used for
certification for various quantum network tasks, in par-
ticular for delegated computation, generation of random-
ness, quantum metrology and quantum secret sharing.
For a given graphG with vertices V , and denotingN(i)
as the neighbours of i ∈ V , associating a qubit to each
vertex, a graph state |G〉 on |V | = n qubits is defined
through the associated stabiliser equations
|G〉 = Si|G〉, (1)
where Si are the graph stabiliser operators, with gen-
erators Si := Xi ⊗j∈N(i) Zj associated to each of the
N veritces, and Xi and Zi are Pauli operators. We de-
note the full stabiliser group S = {Si} =< S1, ..., Sn >,
which has 2N elements. We say that the graph state |G〉
is shared amongst n players, who depending on the ap-
plication may be in one physical location or distributed
across a network.
The idea of the protocol is very straightforward. The
players ask the source for M copies of the graph state.
They choose at random one of these to be used, and
all the rest are tested by randomly choosing a stabiliser
operator and checking it returns the value +1. Since
the malicious parties (the source, channel... everything
except the players) do not know which copy will be tested
or used beforehand, the only way they will always pass
all the tests is if the players receive the intended graph
state each all M times.
PROTOCOL
Many variants of the protocol are possible, adapted
in ways that may depend on the application or imple-
mentation at hand. For clarity we present one particular
simple variant of a protocol. After we will comment on
other possibilities. We start in the standard assumption
that the honest parties, the players, share a secret clas-
sical key k = {r, t}, composed of r ∈ [1...M ], t = {ti}i6=r,
ti ∈ [1, ..., 2
n] denoting K the set of all keys (k ∈ K). The
protocol follows the steps below.
1. The source distributes M n-partite systems to the
n players. In the honest case, this will be M copies
of the graph state |G〉.
2. For copy i 6= r, each player performs their part of
the measurement of stabiliser Sti . If all the sta-
bilisers output value +1, Accept, otherwise Reject.
23. For copy r the state is the quantum output of the
protocol.
The variable M plays the role of security parameter
(see (9)). We briefly comment on some variants. Dif-
ferent parts of the protocol can be changed depending
on the application. Indeed even the way the secret keys
are shared even before the first step may vary, as we will
see for the application to secret sharing. The way that
the outcomes of the test in step 2 is shared and accep-
tance or rejection decided may be important for different
cases, for example if some players in the network are
dishonest or not trusted. One may also want to lower
the accept threshold in step 2 to allow for noisy resource
states, for example accepting if something less than 100%
of stabiliser tests give the correct output +1. We will
come back to these variants at different points later, but
for now we continue with the simplest version presented
above.
SECURITY
We first formalise our notions of security. For simplic-
ity we encode the classical output as orthogonal quantum
states |ACC〉R for accept and |REJ〉R for reject. The
output state will in general depend on the classical key
k = {r, t}. For each key k ∈ K, we denote the output
state of the players plus classical reference system as ρk.
We say the protocol is ǫ-secure if it satisfies the following
two properties
• Completeness. If the players recieve M copies of
the ideal resource state |G〉, then for all keys k
ρk = |G〉P 〈G| ⊗ |ACC〉R〈ACC|. (2)
• Soundness. Denoting the expected output state
over all key strings as ρout :=
1
|K|
∑
k∈K ρ
k, and
denoting the projection Pfail := (I − |G〉P 〈G|) ⊗
|ACC〉R〈ACC|, then
Tr (Pfailρout) ≤ ǫ. (3)
Completeness is trivially guaranteed since the test uses
the stabilisers of the state itself, so it will always accept.
Soundness follows through a similar reasoning to that in
[20]. Let us denote by ρ the state of all the M.n systems
that the players receive in step 1 of the protocol. In order
to bound (3) we only need to to consider the output state
conditioned on accept, let us denote it by ρACC . To find
this we start with the fact that for a given key k = {r, t},
the projection corresponding to accepting allM −1 tests
can be written as :
M r,taccept =
⊗
i6=r
(Sti + Ii)
2
⊗ Ir. (4)
From this we have that ρACC can be written as
ρACC =
M∑
r=1
∑
t
1
M
1
|S|M−1
ρr,t, (5)
with
ρr,t =
1
Tr(M r,tacceptρ)
Trrc(M
r,t
acceptρ), (6)
where Ac denotes the complement of set A.
Putting this together, we obtain
Tr (Pfailρout) =
1
M
Tr (Qρ)) , (7)
where
Q =
M∑
r=1
∑
t
1
SM−1
⊗
i6=r
Sti + Ii
2
⊗ (Ir − |G〉 〈G|)
=
M∑
r=1
⊗
i6=r
Ii + |G〉i〈G|
2
⊗ (Ir − |G〉r 〈G|), (8)
since 1/|S|
∑
i Si = |G〉〈G|. Note that Q is hermitian and
positive. It then remains to check that all eigenvalues of
Q are smaller than 1, for which a proof can be found in
the appendix. It then follows that
Tr(Pfailρout) ≤
1
M
, (9)
for all source states ρ.
The protocol also has natural extensions for higher
prime dimensional graph states, where proofs also follow
straightforwardly.
We now present several applications, where the secu-
rity follows directly as above with a simple application of
our protocol, or slight variants of the security statement
are made (verified t-designs) or some of the variants of
the simplest protocol mentioned above give the utility
required (quantum secret sharing).
APPLICATIONS
We focus on applications that can be considered as
completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) map Γ act-
ing on the quantum output. Since fidelity is monotonic
under CPTP maps, the usefulness or soundness is pre-
served. This is the case, for example, when further inter-
action with the source is not required to run the protocol.
Formally, with respect to the CPTP application Γ one
defines a new fail projector,
PFail(Γ) := (I − Γ (|G〉〈G|))⊗ |ACC〉〈ACC|. (10)
Due to the monotonicity of fidelity, (3) implies that
Tr
(
P
Γ(G)
fail Γ(ρB)
)
≤
1
M
. (11)
We now go through some examples of applications.
3Verified blind quantum computation
In verified blind quantum computation a technologi-
cally limited Alice wishes to delegate some quantum com-
putational task to a server, Bob, in such a way that Bob
does not get information about the computation (blind),
and moreover, that she can be confident the computa-
tion has been carried out correctly (verified). There are
many techniques to achieve this - see [22] for a very recent
overview.
In our scenario Alice is limited to single qubit mea-
surements. Clearly this, on its own, is not enough for
universal quantum computation. However, in measure-
ment based quantum computation (MBQC), universal
quantum computation is achieved by single qubit mea-
surements on a graph state, with feed forward [3]. Im-
portantly the measurements can be made one qubit at a
time. Thus, if Alice asks Bob to provide her with a uni-
versal graph states, either cluster states [3] or brickwork
states [23] for example - Alice can perform the computa-
tion she wants. Moreover this is blind to Bob - he gets
only minimal information, an upper bound to the size of
the computation (given by the size of the graph state Al-
ice asks for). To verify the computation Alice can simply
apply our protocol to test and use a universal graph state
of her choice.
One has the same notions of completeness and sound-
ness as those above, replacing the graph state by the ideal
output of the computation. Completeness follows imme-
diately from the universality of the chosen graph state.
For soundness, we simply note that Alice’s measurement
sequence, which affects the computation, can be under-
stood entirely as a CPTP map on the quantum output
of our protocol. In this way, the condition (11) ensures
soundness also. More specifically, if we denote the ideal
output of a computation as ρcompideal , and the average out-
put of a given computation ρcompout , the failing projector
becomes P compFail := (I − ρ
comp
ideal ) ⊗ |ACC〉〈ACC|, and we
have from (11) a verification soundness condition (see e.g.
[24]),
Tr (P compFail ρ
comp
out ) ≤
1
M
. (12)
Note that, compared to [24], this scaling with resources
is poor. We will talk about this in the conclusions.
We also note that the idea of testing graph states for
MBQC computation has been presented before in sev-
eral measurement based verification schemes, e.g. [25],
[26]. Indeed, this application of our protocol is almost
identical to the verified computation scheme in [26], the
main differences being in the specifics of the test (we
measure settings chosen from all stabilisers, they a sub-
set) and the figure of merit used (we use the correctness
and soundess above, they use the language of hypothe-
sis testing). We present it here simply as an alternative
possible scheme, with similar characteristics. As pointed
out in [26], this scenario is suited to performing fault tol-
erant computation, since Alice could equally ask Bob for
a resource graph state for fault tolerant computation, for
example the topological scheme in [27] using 3D cluster
states. This was the idea of the fault tolerant verified
computation presented in [28], note however that this
works only if the errors on Alice’s measurement device
are assumed to be independent from anything happening
on Bob’s side.
Verified t-designs
Graph states can also be used to sample from a ran-
dom ensemble of unitaries - this is effectively MBQC
without correction, where the measurement outcomes in-
dex which unitary is implemented. In particular, in [29]
it was shown that ensembles with a particularly useful
property of being t-designs can be efficiently sampled us-
ing graph states. A t-design is an ensemble of unitaries
with the property that its statistical moments match
those of a Haar ensemble up to order t, with applica-
tions across quantum information and physics, for exam-
ple in estimating noise [30], private channels [31], mod-
elling thermalisation [32], photonics[33], and even black
hole physics [34]. Later in [35] this approach was devel-
oped to show that efficient t-designs can be generated us-
ing a regular lattice similar to the brickwork state. Both
results rely heavily on the construction of [36, 37] using
random circuits.
Our protocol can be used to certify the application
of a t-design random unitary onto an input, where the
source of the graph state is not trusted. For each set of
measurement outcomes m¯, we denote the applied CPTP
map on the graph state as Γm¯. For simplicity we consider
the action of the induced unitary on the input vertices
I ⊂ V corresponing to inputs in the state |+〉. Then
[29, 35] state that measurement result m¯, occuring with
probability pm¯ applies a unitary on the input |+〉
⊗|I|
Γm¯(|G〉) = U m¯|+〉⊗|I|, (13)
such that the ensemble {pm¯, U
m¯} is an approximate t-
design (see [29] for detailed definitions).
For security of verified t-designs one can replace the
graph state in the definitions (2),(3) by the output state
(13). The soundness is then guaranteed for each m¯ by
(11). It can easily be seen that one can flip this around
to give a statement on the fidelity,
F (U m¯|ψ〉,Γm¯(ρACC))
2 ≥ 1−
1
PaccM
, (14)
where Pacc is the probability of passing the tests and
ρACC is the output of the protocol conditioned on ac-
cepting.
4Quantum Metrology
In quantum metrology entangled states are used to
measure with more precision than is possible with classi-
cal probes [38]. The general setting can be understood as
an interferometer which imparts a phase ψ on one arm,
each time a system passes through it. The idea is to send
in many probes N in an entangled state ρ, whereafter
measurements can reveal the phase with higher precision
than possible sending in separable states.
How well this process allows the parameter ψ to be
estimated is quantified by the Quantum Fisher Informa-
tion, FQ(ρ). Note, as indicated by the notation, for a
simple interferometer the quantum Fisher information is
independent of the value of ψ since it is unitarily en-
coded [39, 40]. In particular, for ν independent repeti-
tions of the process, the precision is characterised by the
mean squared error ∆2ψ˜ of a (consistent and unbiased)
estimator ψ˜, which is lower bounded by the Quantum
Crame´r-Rao Bound [41],
∆2ψ˜ ≥
1
νFQ(ρ)
. (15)
For the standard interferometer, the best possible scal-
ing with N is achieved by the N -party GHZ state
1√
2
(|0〉⊗N + |1〉⊗N). Denoting its density matrix ρGHZ
we have FQ(ρGHZ) = N
2. The GHZ state is locally
equivalent to a graph state for the fully connected graph.
Our certification protocol can easily be adapted using the
same local unitaries to test ρGHZ (simply by rotating the
test measurements accordingly).
In [40] they show that the quantum Fisher informa-
tion of two states differs by an amount bounded by their
fidelity
|FQ(ρ)−FQ(σ)| ≤ 6
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2N2, (16)
if ρ or σ are pure. That is, if two states are close, as
measured by their fidelity, their usefulness for quantum
metrology is close. Given the fidelity bound implied by
our test (14), we see that the quantum Fisher information
is also bounded. For the rotated protocol testing a GHZ
states, given the output state conditioned on accepting
ρACC , we have,
FQ(ρACC) ≥ N
2
(
1−
6
PACCM
)
. (17)
Secret sharing over untrusted channels
In quantum secret sharing a dealer wishes to distribute
a secret quantum state amongst N players such that only
certain subsets of players can access the secret - the au-
thorised sets. It was shown in [4, 42] that any secret
sharing scheme can be implemented using graph states.
However, these rely on the trusted sharing of the graph
state. If we are careful, a variant of our protocol can be
used to boost these protocols to one where the network
of dealer and players do not need to trust the source of
the graph state or the channels used to share them.
There are two important subtleties in the application
of our protocol here, stemming from the fact that unau-
thorised sets of players should be treated as adversaries.
Firstly, it makes their inclusion in the stabiliser tests not
ideal. Secondly, if they also have access to the random
key k this could potentially allow attacks. In [20] a pro-
tocol was presented which can be understood as a variant
of the application of our scheme where i) the stabiliser
tests are restricted to an authorised set, and ii) the clas-
sical key k is distributed by a classical secret sharing
scheme, with the same access structure. A proof of prin-
ciple example of this protocol was implemented in [7],
demonstrating its simplicity.
CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have presented a protocol for certi-
fying graph states and a few applications in quantum
networks. There are clearly some applications that our
protocol would not be suited for - namely ones where
further interactions are required with Bob. Such inter-
actions may allow for Bob to correlate his strategy in
cheating the ‘test’ part to the future applications poten-
tially threatening functionality (be it security or other-
wise). Nevertheless its simplicity lends itself to many
applications as we have seen, not only in the form of pro-
tocol presented here, but also its suitability to permit
variants, as with secret sharing. A simple variant can
also deal with noisy states for example, where one would
not expect, even an honest noisy source to pass all the
time. In such a case one can change the accept require-
ment to require some smaller portion of correct answers.
One can adapt the security statements and proofs to this
end without too much difficulty.
We end with a discussion on scaling of soundness con-
dition with S. In the kind of protocol presented here, it
is impossible to beat the 1/S scaling. This is clear sim-
ply because a malicious party can behave honestly for
all but one requested state, and send one false/dishonest
state. With probability 1/S the malicious party’s choice
of when to be dishonest coincides with the users choice
of which one would be used and not tested, so strategy
passes the test perfectly yet the state can be arbitrar-
ily far from the ideal one and potentially ruin whatever
application. Thus in order to beat the 1/S scaling one
expects to need some more entanglement. This can be
done, for example, by encoding the desired state on some
randomly chosen error correcting code - the essential trick
used in the original authentication paper by Barnum et
al [21]. Such an approach can give an exponential scal-
5ing in security with the number of systems sent. The
downside now is that the entanglement required scales
with the security. This then suggests a tradeoff between
entanglement and scaling.
In this context, the advantage of our protocol is that,
for many applications, the difficulty in implementing a
certified version of an application becomes only the same
difficulty as producing the same resource state many
times, rather than asking for much more difficult larger,
scaling, entanglement. In optics for example, this ad-
vantage makes certified secret sharing possible [7], doing
so an entangled code version would require impractical
scaling in entanglement.
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Appendix
We can write Q (8) as
Q =
M∑
r=1
Qr (18)
with
Qr =
⊗
i6=r
Ii + |G〉i〈G|
2
⊗ (Ir − |G〉r〈G|) (19)
Let’s define A as I+|G〉〈G|2 and B as I− |G〉〈G|.
An eigenvector for A with eigenvalue 1 is just given by
|G〉. Denoting |G′〉 an eigenvector with eigenvalue 1 of
B, an complete eigenbasis for Q is given by all possible
combinations of tensor products of those vectors. B acts
on |G〉 as B|G〉 = |G〉 − |G〉 = 0 while A|G′〉 = |G
′〉
2 +
|G〉〈G|G′〉
2 =
|G′〉
2 as 〈G|G
′〉 = 0.
We can then write Qr =
⊗r−1
i=1 Ai
⊗
Br
⊗M
l=r+1Al
where r denotes the position of B in the tensor. We then
denote the k-th family of eigenvectors where |G′〉 appears
k times as |Eig〉k =
⊗
j 6=k |G〉k
⊗
k 6=j |G〉k|k + j =M
Trying to determinate the action from Qr on |Eig〉k,
we have to distinguish the following cases :
Let r be in [1,M−k]. |G〉 will then be projected to the
eigenvalue 0 so that these cases are trivial. Regarding r
in [k,M ] gives us B|G′〉 = |G′〉. After then, A acts for
k − 1 times on |G′〉 giving the eigenvalue 12k−1 .
Putting this together and regarding the symmetry of
Q with respect to permutations of r within the sum the
distribution of |G〉 and |G′〉 in the eigenvectors does not
matter. It suffices to know, how often |G′〉 appears. The
sum contains M − k elements with eigenvalue 0 and the
remaining k elements with eigenvalue 12k−1 . The sum-
mation gives than as eigenvalue k2k−1 for every |Eig〉k ,
which is always below one.]
